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Abstract: The standard theory of optimal income taxation under uncertainty has been developed 
under the assumption that individuals maximize expected utility. However, prospect theory has 
now been established as an alternative model of individual behaviour, with empirical support. 
This paper explores the theory of optimal income taxation under uncertainty when individuals 
behave according to the tenets of prospect theory. It is seen that many of the standard results are 
either overturned, or modified in interesting ways. The validity of the First Order Approach 
requires new conditions that are developed in the paper. And when these conditions are valid, it 
is shown that optimal marginal tax rates on low incomes will tend to be lower under prospect 
theory than under expected utility theory. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
In principal-agent models with moral hazard, the agent’s income and utility depends randomly 
on effort. In one of his Nobel Prize winning contributions, Mirrlees (1974) characterizes optimal 
income taxation where the government is the principal and ex ante identical individuals are the 
agents1. In this contribution, as in most principal-agent analysis, expected utility theory is used as 
a description of agents’ behaviour under uncertainty. In his Nobel Lecture, Mirrlees (1997, p. 
1324) calls for closer scrutiny of this approach:  
 
‘Problems of this kind are usually analysed with the assumption that people try to maximise their 
expected utility. There are good reasons for thinking that may be a mistake. At least the 
consequences of alternative theories of decisions under uncertainty for these situations should be 
explored.’ 
 
One such alternative theory of decision making under uncertainty has in turn led to another 
Nobel Prize. Prospect theory, developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), has garnered 
significant empirical support (see Kahneman’s Nobel lecture, 2003, and Camerer and 
Lowenstein, 2003). In prospect theory, an individual’s utility depends on how the outcome 
deviates from some reference point, rather than directly on the absolute value of the outcome. 
Individuals are loss averse, in other words, a loss leads to a larger change in welfare than a gain 
of a similar size. Finally, individuals may misperceive probabilities underlying the decision 
problem. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to confront the Mirrlees project of characterizing optimal income 
taxation with moral hazard under uncertainty, with the Kahneman project of developing 
alternatives to standard expected utility theory. In the original Mirrlees’ (1974) formulation of 
the income tax model, workers and the government maximise workers’ expected utility over 
income and effort. Our purpose is to introduce elements of prospect theory into individual 
behaviour, in keeping with the emerging empirical consensus. However, the preferences used by 
the social planner remains an open question. Should the government maximize individual 
                                                 
1 Of course the case with no uncertainty but where individuals differ in their productivities, was also introduced and 
explored by Mirrlees (1971) in the more famous of his Nobel prize winning contributions. We will refer to this 
2 
welfare as the individual sees it, i.e., should it be “welfarist”? Or, as is suggested in some recent 
behavioural economics literature, should it be “non-welfarist” and use expected utility theory to 
evaluate outcomes, even though individuals use prospect theory? The latter approach is relatively 
common in conventional public economics, and has been used recently in the behavioural public 
economics literature as well.2 In this paper we develop a general approach that encompasses both 
welfarist and non-welfarist perspectives, and then specialise to draw implications for each case.  
 
When prospect theory is used as a description of individual behaviour, another interesting 
connection to earlier tax analysis emerges. What determines the reference income level which 
individuals use in assessing losses and gains in prospect theory? One plausible specification is 
that individuals compare their ex post outcome relative to the mean of the outcome for other 
individuals. This comes very close to models of optimal taxation with utility interdependence (or 
envy), explored in the conventional optimal taxation setting without income uncertainty (e.g. 
Oswald, 1983 and Tuomala, 1990). Thus, parts of this paper can also be seen as conducting an 
analysis of taxation with utility interdependence under income uncertainty. Another possibility is 
that the reference point could be a past consumption level. Then the analysis bears resemblance 
to habit formation models, such as Ljunqvist and Uhlig (2000) or Carroll, Overland and Weil 
(2000).  
 
The paper first reviews the standard, benchmark, model of optimal taxation with moral hazard 
under income uncertainty, in Section 2. As is common in models of this kind, we mostly focus 
on results based on the so-called “first-order approach”. This section therefore also examines the 
exact conditions under which this approach is valid, an issue that will seen to be relevant when 
prospect theory is introduced. Section 3 develops a solution to the tax problem under uncertainty 
with moral hazard in the general setting where individuals use one set of preferences to evaluate 
outcomes, but the government uses a different set of preferences. Section 4 then interprets these 
general results when individual behaviour is described by prospect theory, but the government 
uses expected utility theory to evaluate outcomes. The case where individuals and the 
                                                                                                                                                             
“adverse selection” case from time to time, but our focus is on the “moral hazard” case where there is uncertainty 
but no ex ante differentiation among individuals. 
2 An example of the former is Kanbur, Keen and Tuomala (1994), while O’Donoghue and Rabin (2003) is an 
example of the latter. 
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government both use prospect theory is discussed in the Appendix. Section 5 extends the 
analysis by considering the case where the reference income of prospect theory is endogenised. 
Section 6 concludes.  
 
2.  The standard model 
 
Consider an economy, as in Mirrlees (1974), where the worker-consumer does not know what 
income he or she will receive for each possible level of effort. Thus the worker’s gross income, z, 
depends randomly on effort, y. There is a single worker or, alternatively, all workers are ex ante 
identical. Thus income differences are not due to differences in innate skills (as in conventional 
optimal income taxation model under certainty, Mirrlees, 1971), but due to luck (for any given 
level of effort). Let ),( yzf  and ),( yzF  denote the continuous density and distribution functions 
of income z given that effort y is undertaken by the worker; it is assumed that they are 
continuously differentiable for all z and y. The worker-consumer chooses effort y to maximize 
expected utility 
(1) ∫ dzyzfyxu ),(),( , 
where )(zTzx −=  is the after tax income / consumption. As in much of the literature, we 
concentrate on an additively separable specification of the utility function, written as 
yxvyxu −= )(),( . The consumer is risk averse, hence 0,0 <′′>′ vv . The first-order condition 
for the maximisation of (1) is 
(2) 01)( =−∫ dzfxv y  
The government is utilitarian and maximises (1) subject to the individual optimisation constraint 
(2) and the budget constraint which, for large identical population with independent and 
identically distributed states of nature, can be written in the form 
(3) [ ]∫ =− 0),( yzfxz  
Taking multipliers α and λ for the constraints (2) and (3) respectively, the Lagrangean and the 
first-order condition wrt x (pointwise optimisation) are as follows: 
(4) [ ]{ } ydzfxvyzfxzxvL y −−+−+= ∫ ααλ )(),()()(  
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(5) 
v
g ′=+
λα1 , 
where ffg y= is the likelihood ratio. This approach, where incentive compatibility is modelled 
using equation (2), is the so-called first-order approach (FOA). Mirrlees (1975, 1999) was the 
first to point out that FOA is not necessarily a valid procedure in a potentially large number of 
cases, because it might lead to a local instead of a global optimum. Mirrlees (1976), Rogerson 
(1985), Jewitt (1988) and Alvi (1997) have explored conditions under which the FOA provides 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimisation. When the utility function is separable as 
in our set-up, sufficient conditions are the so-called monotone likelihood ratio condition (MLRC) 
and convex distribution function condition (CDFC). We demonstrate this below to provide a 
comparison to the novel cases in later sections. 
 
First, as an intermediate step, it must be checked that consumption is increasing in income / 
effort, i.e. )(zx′  is positive. The right-hand side of the first-order condition in (5) is increasing in 
)(yz , since 0<′′v . The left-hand side of (5) is increasing with )(yz , provided that α >0, since 
0>′g  when we assume that the MLRC (monotone likelihood ratio condition) holds.  
 
Following Jewitt (1988) and Laffont and Martimort (2002) we now show that α  is indeed 
positive. Dividing (5) byλ , multiplying it with f and integrating over the support [ ]zz,  yields 
(6) ∫= fdzv'11λ  
since ∫ = 0dzf y . Using (5) again gives 
(7)  ∫ ′−′= fdzvvg 11λα  
Multiply both sides by vf and integrate over the support [ ]zz,  to get 
(8) 
)
'
1,cov(
)
'
1,cov(
v
v
v
vdzvf y
=
=∫
λ
α
λ
α
 
where cov() denotes the covariance operator. The second line follows from the incentive 
constraint (2). Since v  and 'v  covary in opposite, we necessarily have 0≥α . However, the only 
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case where the covariance is zero is when x is constant irrespective of income. But then the 
worker has no incentives to provide positive effort. Therefore, to induce effort, 0>α . 
 
Finally, it remains to be shown that expected utility is concave. For this, rewrite the expected 
utility as follows: 
(9) [ ]
∫
∫
∫
−−=
−−=
−
ydzyzFxvzxv
ydzyzFxvyzvF
ydzyzfxv
z
z
),(''))((
),(''),(
),()(
 
where the second line follows from integration by parts and the third from using the property that 
0),( =yzF  and 1),( =yzF . From the last row, since 'v  and 'x  are positive, the expected utility 
is concave in y if yyF >0. This property is called the convexity of the distribution function 
condition (CDFC). Therefore, the FOA is a valid strategy given that MLRP and CDFC hold. 
 
We can now turn to the properties of the solution. Differentiate (5) again with respect to z and 
reorganise to obtain the shape of )(zx′ : 
(10) 
v
gvx ′′
′′−=′ λ
α 2)(  
Denote the coefficient of absolute risk aversion as )/()( vv ′′′−=δ . Based on (10), the marginal 
tax rate ( )(zTMTR ′= ) is therefore given by 
(11) λδ
α gvxMTR ′′−=′−= 11  
This shows that the optimal marginal tax rate is a compromise between risk aversion and 
providing incentives. If the consumers become more risk averse, the marginal tax rate increases, 
ceteris paribus. On the other hand, if effort is more tightly connected with income ( g ′  goes up), 
workers' effort can be more reliably tracked, and the optimal marginal tax rate is reduced.  
 
3.  Moral hazard and non-welfarism 
 
The standard solution presented above was based on “expected utility welfarism” – the 
government used the same objective function as the individuals in assessing social welfare, 
6 
namely maximising expected utility. In non-welfarist welfare economics, the individuals' and the 
government's objective functions differ. Seade (1980) derives optimal tax rules under a general 
non-welfarist objective function for the adverse selection case. Kanbur et al (1994) and Pirttilä 
and Tuomala (2004) consider the implications of poverty alleviation as a policy objective on 
optimal income taxation and the combination of income commodity taxation rules, respectively. 
All these papers deal with the Mirrlees (1971) formulation of optimal tax policy, where 
individuals' innate skill levels differ. Our purpose is here to provide a general non-welfarist tax 
analysis in the moral hazard situation. The tax rules are then interpreted from the prospect theory 
viewpoint in Section 4. 
 
Consider a situation where the government uses a utility function yxvyxu −= )(),( , whereas the 
individuals themselves maximise their welfare using another utility function, say, ),(~ yxu . For 
simplicity, let us concentrate on the case where the difference is only related to the utility derived 
from consumption. Then we define yxeyxu −≡ )(),(~ . The individual maximises this with 
respect to effort, giving rise to the first-order condition 
(12) 01)( =−∫ dzfxe y  
The government maximises its utility function subject to (12) and the budget constraint (3). The 
Lagrangean and the first-order condition are now: 
(13) [ ]{ } ydzfxeyzfxzxvL y −−+−+= ∫ ααλ )(),()()(  
(14) 0=−′+′ ffefv y λα  
Differentiation of (14) yields  
(15) 
gev
gex ′′+′′
′′−=′ α
α . 
Let us first revisit the conditions when the FOA is a valid solution procedure for this 
optimisation problem. Again, as an intermediate step, consumption x should be increasing in 
income z. The numerator of (15) is positive, assuming that α >0 and 0>′e , and that MLRC 
holds. Given that the numerator is positive, the denominator must be negative, i.e. 0<′′+′′ gev α . 
If both the government's and the individuals' utility function exhibit decreasing marginal utility, 
this is always satisfied. Alternatively, one function, say e, may not be concave, but its impact is 
offset by the concavity of v.  
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The next step is to show that α >0. Rearrange (14) to get 
(16) 
'
1
'
'1
v
g
v
e =+ λ
α
λ  
Integrating over the support [ ]zz,   yields 
(17) ∫= fdzv'11λ  
and the first-order condition can be written as: 
(18) ∫−= fdzvvgve '1'1''λα  
By multiplying with v and integrating over the support [ ]zz,  one obtains 
(19) )
'
1,cov(
'
'
v
vg
v
ve =∫λα  
The right-hand side is always non-negative. So is the term multiplying α  on the left. Therefore 
we necessarily have 0≥α . Again, to induce a positive effort level, α  cannot be equal to zero. 
Hence, α  is positive. 
 
It remains to show that the objective function is concave. This has actually been already shown 
above in equation (9). To summarise, 
 
Proposition 1. The first-order approach is a valid solution procedure if the monotone 
likelihood ratio and convexity of the distribution function properties hold and a novel 
condition is valid, namely a combination of v ′′  and e ′′ is sufficiently negative.  
 
We now turn to the interpretation of the tax rule. Note first that in the standard case of the 
previous section, the marginal tax rate, given in (11), can be rewritten as 
vg
gvMTR ′′+
′′+=
)1(
1 α
α  
by (5). By adding and subtracting gv ′′α  to the right-hand side of (15), dividing it by vg ′′+ )1( α , 
and rearranging, the marginal tax rate of this section can be written as  
(20) 


′′+
′−′′−′′+
′′
′′
′′+
++=′−=
vg
evg
vg
gv
v
eg
gxMTR
)1(
)(
)1(1
111 α
α
α
α
α
α . 
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The first term in the brackets on the right-hand side of (20) is similar to the tax rule in the 
welfarist setting. It is, however, multiplied by a novel term that depends on the relative concavity 
of v and e. In addition, there is another new term, the second-term within the brackets, arising 
from the non-welfarist objective. It measures the difference between the welfare assessments of 
the individual and the government. Depending on the magnitude of e and v, this term may either 
increase or decrease the marginal tax rate. The following proposition summarises: 
 
Proposition 2. The marginal tax rate in the non-welfarist moral hazard problem is a 
combination of the standard marginal tax rule and a new term measuring the deviation 
between individual and social preferences.  
 
The structure of the non-welfarist tax rule in (20) for the moral hazard case is similar in spirit to 
the non-welfarist rule calculated by Seade (1980) for the adverse selection case. Note finally that 
if ve = , the rule collapses to the standard welfarist rule, expressed in equation  (11) in the 
previous section. 
 
4.  Prospect theory and moral hazard 
 
This section interprets the general analysis in the previous section by assuming that individual 
behaviour is described by prospect theory, while government behaviour is described by expected 
utility theory. The case where both principal and agent use prospect theory is discussed in the 
appendix. 
 
In prospect theory, the utility function is replaced by a value function. The key assumptions 
about the value function are that it ‘is (i) defined on deviations from the reference point; (ii) 
generally concave for gains and convex for losses; (iii) steeper for losses than for gains’ 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979). The two latter properties capture the idea that individuals are 
loss averse. Hence, the value function takes the S-shaped value as in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: An example of a value function. 
 
Individuals now maximise the expectation of the value function  
(21) ydzyzfxxe −−∫ ),()(  
which is again additively separable between effort and income. The reference income, which is 
the basis of comparison for the individual, is depicted by x . The reference income is for the 
moment assumed to be exogenous; it is endogenised in Section 5.  
 
To capture the shape of the value function, we make the following assumptions about the 
properties of the utility function:3 
(22) 
xxforexxforexxfore
e
==′′><′′<>′′
>′
0,0,0
,0
 
We can now utilise the results of the previous section by assuming that the government is non-
welfarist, using v, and the individuals' e has its shape from prospect theory. For the moment we 
also assume that the government and the individual have the same perception of probabilities—
                                                 
3 In prospect theory, there is a kink in the value function at the reference income. Here it is assumed that the second 
derivative smoothly changes from positive to zero and to negative to guarantee differentiability. Differentiability is 
crucial for the “first order approach” to principal-agent problems. Analysis of the non-differentiable case is a topic 
for future research. 
 
gainslosses
value
10
 
the misperception issue will be dealt with presently. It will be helpful to rewrite x′  in (15), using 
(14) as  
(23) 
)( vv
gex
ev ′−−′
′′=′ λδδ
α , 
where vvv ′′′−=δ  is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion and eee ′′′=δ  is the degree of loss 
aversion. Note that both are defined to be positive for xx < . The term v′−λ  is positive because 
of (14). The marginal tax rate is  
(24) 
)(
11
vv
gexMTR
ev ′−−′
′′−=′−= λδδ
α , 
For the first-order approach to be a valid solution procedure, x should be increasing in z. For 
xx ≥ , this is always the case because then 0≤eδ , and the denominator in (23) and the term at 
the right of (23) are positive.  
 
However, if xx < , the denominator in (23) may be either positive or negative. Then the FOA 
remains valid if the coefficient of loss aversion is sufficiently smaller than the coefficient of risk 
aversion, i.e. )( vv ev ′−>′ λδδ . This is equivalent to the novel condition found in Proposition 1. 
However, with sufficiently strong loss aversion, )( vv ev ′−<′ λδδ , the denominator and the 
right-hand side of (23) are negative, i.e. consumption would be decreasing in income (effort). 
This violates the validity of the first-order approach. Therefore, the following proposition holds. 
 
Proposition 3. With sufficiently strong loss aversion, the first-order approach is not a valid 
solution procedure for the entire range of realised income, when the individuals' decisions 
are based on prospect theory. 
 
The optimal solution is therefore non-continuous. For consumption above the reference level, the 
marginal tax rate is given by (24). For low consumption and strong loss aversion, a randomised 
schedule is optimal. To see this, note that loss aversion, the convexity of the value function, 
implies that the consumer is in fact risk loving, if income is below the reference point. It is 
therefore conceivable why conditions needed for an insurance scheme are then not valid. In 
contrast, a risk-loving consumer by definition prefers a randomised schedule ( xx ,0 ), where 0x  
11
 
is the smallest possible value of income, to a certain combination of 0x  and x . This suggests 
that the following position holds. 
 
Proposition 4.  In a non-welfarist moral hazard tax problem, when the individuals' decision 
making is based on prospect theory, the optimal incentive structure for incomes below the 
reference point ( xx < )  is a randomised schedule ( xx ,0 ) if individuals' loss-aversion 
sufficiently outweighs the government's risk aversion. If the government's risk aversion 
sufficiently outweighs individuals' loss-aversion or income is above the reference point 
( xx > ), the FOA is valid and the marginal tax rate is given by (24).  
 
Then the overall tax schedule is a combination of the randomisation for xx ≤  and a typical tax 
function with some redistribution for xx > . The point that randomisation may be desirable in 
moral hazard context is not new. Holmström (1979) and Arnott and Stiglitz (1988) have shown, 
however, that randomisation is never optimal for a standard, concave, moral hazard problem as 
in Section 2. Rather, it can become optimal in more complicated situations (Arnott and Stiglitz 
1988).4  
 
It is interesting to examine how the continuous part of the solution, the marginal tax rate given in 
(24), changes when loss aversion changes. Since v′−λ  is positive, an increase in (positive) eδ  
tends to reduce the marginal tax rate. Ceteris paribus, the marginal tax rate of the non-welfarist 
solution with prospect theory is therefore smaller than one given by the standard solution.5 It 
may be surprising that the fact that individuals dislike losses – in the present framework ending 
up with smaller income than the average – results in a smaller marginal tax rate than in the 
standard case. However, it follows from a desire by the government to reduce the possibility that 
an individual ends up with a small income. Then it is in the individuals' and the government’s 
interest to reduce the marginal tax rate to induce more effort. A reduction in the marginal tax rate 
is also understandable due to the fact that that for a range or income, individuals are risk loving, 
                                                 
4 Of course, the question remains how randomisation can be implemented in real world tax policy. One of the ideas 
presented in this context is lax control of tax evasion. 
5 This effect can also been found from the formulation (20) of the marginal tax rate by considering a small increase 
in e ′′  on the MTR, and noting that the first term in the brackets is negative. 
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i.e. 0>′′e . Then the need for insurance is diminished. When income is above the reference level, 
e has a standard risk aversion feature, i.e. 0<′
′′=
e
e
eδ . Then the income tax offers insurance. 
 
Of course, this kind of comparative static analysis treats the Lagrangean multipliers as fixed 
when changing the parameters and the functions of the model.6 It is clear that the results then are 
at best an approximation. To gain better understanding of the form of optimal schedule would 
require numerical simulations. They are challenging in the present case with a partly convex 
objective function. This is a topic for further research. 
 
In this class of models, the sign of the change in the marginal tax rate – i.e. whether the marginal 
tax rate increases or decreases with income – cannot be solved in general. However, one can find 
a formulation that helps gain intuition of the terms affecting the marginal tax. The derivative of 
the marginal tax rate can be written as follows: 
(25) ( ) [ ])(2 gegxexvgegegxez
MTR ′′′+′′′′+′′′′′′−′′′+′′′′=∂
∂ αξ
α
ξ
α , 
where gev ′′+′′= αξ . The sign of (25) remains ambiguous in general. However, one can notice, 
following Low and Maldoom (2004), that the marginal tax rate is the less progressive, the higher 
is v ′′′ . The third derivative measures the importance of precautionary incentives ('prudence'). 
Other things equal, an increase in prudential behaviour reduces the progressivity of the marginal 
tax rate. In the present context, the progressivity also depends on e ′′′ . Unlike for prudence, 
similar intuition has not been developed, to our knowledge, for the third derivative of the value 
function contained in the prospect theory. One can note that if e ′′′  is positive, loss aversion 
decreases with income, and the marginal income tax rate becomes less progressive.  
 
There is one element of prospect theory which we have not addressed yet. This is the possibility 
that the government and individuals perceive the distribution of z in a different manner. Indeed 
prospect theory also maintains that individuals do not assess probabilities with the true density 
function, say f, but with some transformation )( fπ , which underweighs high probabilities and 
overweighs small probabilities (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).  
13
 
This has potentially two problems. First, the weighting schemes do not always satisfy stochastic 
dominance. Second, weighting schemes may not necessarily be easily extended to a continuum 
of outcomes. These problems are addressed in the cumulative version of prospect theory 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1992). In this context, one must assume that the distribution function 
used by the individuals have some of the standard properties for the first-order approach to be 
valid (monotone likelihood ratio and convexity of the distribution function). In principle, there is 
no particular reason why these could not hold. While the level of density function differs 
between the true f and )( fπ , it does mean that the properties of the distribution function should 
change. 
 
Introducing )( fπ  to the optimisation problem is straightforward.7 Then in the optimal tax rule 
the government corrects ‘wrong’ perceptions by the individuals in its marginal tax rate, (24), 
through newly defined π
π yfg ′= . This observation bears interesting resemblance to the merit 
good analysis of Sandmo (1983). He builds on the idea that individuals may misperceive 
probabilities of uncertain outcomes. The ex post economic outcome, resulting from misinformed 
choices, is therefore inefficient. Instead of evaluating welfare based on individuals’ expected 
utility, he proposes to specify the social welfare function in terms of individuals’ ex post or 
realised utility levels. Such a formulation means that consumer sovereignty is only disregarded 
ex ante. The case for government intervention arises because consumer demands do not 
adequately represent their tastes due to distorted information. Similar reasoning applies here. The 
marginal tax rate differs from one in the standard model by correcting the way misperceived 
probabilities affect the choice for effort.  
 
Finally, one can also consider a case where both the government and the individuals apply 
prospect theory as the basis of decision making. This situation can be called “prospect theory 
welfarism”, as the government accepts the individuals' valuation for evaluation of social welfare. 
This problem can be analysed as a special case of the model in Section 3, when the objective 
function for the government and for the individual has the properties stipulated in (22). The 
                                                                                                                                                             
6 The problem is similar in standard analysis of moral hazard, such as in Varian (1980).  
7 For brevity, these calculations are not presented here. They are available from the authors upon request. 
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analytics of this case are presented in full in the Appendix, but the results remain broadly the 
same. The first-order approach is not valid for the full range of income, randomisation becomes 
optimal for incomes below the reference point, and above the preference point, the marginal tax 
rate provides some, less than full, insurance. A key difference is that the formula for the marginal 
tax rate for income above the reference point is similar to the standard solution of Section 2, and 
does not include a term correcting for the difference between private and social valuation (as 
they are the same). 
 
5.  Endogenous reference point 
 
Prospect theory brings to center stage the reference level of income around which the value 
function is defined. But what determines this reference point? If we assume that the reference 
income is somehow related to the overall economy then we are in a terrain familiar to optimal 
tax theory. Oswald (1983) and Tuomala (1990), for example, consider the implication of utility 
interdependence (or 'envy') – the situation in which individual's utility is negatively affected by 
others' income – on optimal income taxation. But in these models differences are due to 
differences in ex ante skill levels. In the Mirrlees moral hazard model, differences arise due to 
luck. 
 
An additional problem related to utility interdependence is that it is not clear whether it should be 
allowed to enter the social welfare function: is envy a trait one wants to honour? The non-
welfarist approach, such as ours, does not suffer from this criticism. Utility interdependence 
affects the way people behave, which the government must take into account as a constraint 
when designing tax schedules, but allowing for envy need not be included in the government 
objective function. 
 
We endogenise the reference income x  in the following way. As in utility interdependence 
models, suppose it is a function of aggregate consumption as follows 
(26) ∫= fdzzxzx )()(φ  
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where φ  are the weights given for each individual's consumption. Simple examples are where 
the sum ofφ :s is equal to one, when x is equal to aggregate consumption, or when 
n
1=φ  where 
n is the number of individuals, when x is equal to average consumption. With no loss in 
generality, here we concentrate on the former. 
 
Denoting the Lagrange multiplier related to the constraint in (26) as µ , the Langrangean with 
endogenous x  looks like: 
(27) [ ] [ ]{ } xydzfxxeyzfxxzxvL y µααµλ −−−−++−+= ∫ )(),()()(  
The first-order conditions for x and x are 
(28) 0=+−′+′ fffefv y µλα  
(29) 0=−′− µα yfe  
From (29), one notices that 0<′−= yfeαµ . Rewrite (28) as  
(30) 
v
g
v
e
′−=+
1)(
'
'1 µλα  
Differentiation of (30) yields  
(31) ge
v
v
v
veevgx ′′=


′
′′−+′
′′′−′′′′ αλµα )(  
Rearranging of (31) gives 
(32) [ ] gegegex ev ′′=−−−′ αδαδαµλ ')'(  
Utilising the definitions vvv ′′′−=δ  and eee ′′′=δ , and the property that 'vge =′−− αµλ  
(from equation 28), one can write  
(33) 
ev gev
gex δαδ
α
'−′
′′=′  
and 
(34) 
ev gev
gexMTR δαδ
α
'
11 −′
′′−=′−=  
Now for the FOA to be valid, x must again be increasing in z. Assuming that 0>α , the 
numerator of (33) is positive. Using (29), the denominator is positive if )( µλδδ −′−>′ vv ev , i.e 
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if risk aversion is sufficiently higher than loss aversion. Because of 0<µ , the condition is more 
stringent than in the case, derived in the previous section, where the reference income was 
exogenous. The intuition is that an increase in an individual's income now has a smaller social 
value, as it reduces the perceived utility by others.  
With some manipulation, one can then show that α  is indeed positive in this setting as well,8 
and the rest of the conditions stay the same. Therefore, the conditions for the FOA to be valid are 
the monotone like ratio property, the convexity of the distribution function, and that risk aversion 
is higher than a new threshold level that is dependent on loss aversion and the magnitude of 
envy. If the last condition is not satisfied, randomisation again occurs. 
 
For the marginal tax rate, the following result emerges: 
 
Proposition 5. When the reference income is a positive function of aggregate income, the 
optimal incentive structure for incomes below the reference point ( xx < )  is a randomised 
schedule ( xx ,0 ) if individuals' loss aversion outweighs the government's risk aversion. If 
the government's risk aversion outweighs individuals' loss-aversion or income is above the 
reference point ( xx > ), the FOA is valid and marginal tax rate tends to rise in comparison 
to the case with exogenous reference level. 
  
The first part of this follows from the invalidity of the FOA. The second part is due to the 
presence of 0<µ  in (34). By (29), It increases v′ , and therefore increases the marginal tax rat 
compared to the case where x  exogenous. The intuition is that it is optimal to reduce the 
incentives for exerting effort as higher effort and higher income have a negative externality by 
increasing the reference income of other individuals in the economy. The presence of µ  
therefore introduces a corrective (or externality-internalising) element to the marginal tax rate. 
 
A similar effect has been earlier found in utility interdependence models in the conventional 
income tax framework. The intuition obtained there therefore carries over to the present moral 
hazard case. It is interesting that while the general tax rules in the moral hazard and the adverse 
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selection cases have little in common, the influence of utility interdependence on tax rates in 
both cases is similar. Note finally that the presence of utility interdependence does not change 
the incentive structure below the reference income, as the solution is not continuous. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
This study analysed a model of optimal non-linear income taxation under income uncertainty, 
along the lines of Mirrlees (1974), from a non-welfarist point of view where the government's 
and the individuals' objective functions differ. It then interpreted the optimal income tax rule 
derived under non-welfarism assuming that the individuals' decision making follows prospect 
theory as developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). 
 
As does most of the literature in the area, we focused on the so-called first-order approach for 
solving the optimisation problem. The conditions for the validity of this approach include a novel 
requirement in the non-welfarist case. And the marginal income tax rate was shown to be a 
combination of the standard, welfarist, rule, and a new term that corrects for the differences 
between individuals' and government's assessment of welfare. 
 
The non-welfarist tax rule becomes particularly relevant when agent's behaviour is interpreted 
using prospect theory instead of expected utility maximisation. It appeared that changing the 
underlying assumption of agent behaviour in moral hazard models has a surprisingly drastic 
influence on optimal compensation structure / marginal tax rates.  
 
In particular, one can show that the solution is non-monotonic under prospect theory. This 
follows from loss aversion, in other words convexity of the value function, implied by prospect 
theory, when the consumers are in fact risk-loving for a certain range of low incomes.  If 
consumers' loss aversion is sufficiently strong and it offsets the government's risk aversion, it 
becomes optimal to offer a randomised tax schedule for low incomes. A corollary of this finding 
is that the solution procedure commonly applied in this sort of models, the first-order approach, 
                                                                                                                                                             
8 A crucial step for showing this is to demonstrate that a counterpart of equation (17) can be derived in the presence 
of µ  in the first-order condition (28). This is possible by substituting for µ  from (29) in (28). 
18
 
is not valid for the full range of income. If government's loss aversion outweighs individuals' risk 
aversion, the optimal solution is a function of both risk aversion and loss aversion. In this case 
the optimal marginal tax rate under prospect theory is likely to be smaller than in the 
conventional moral hazard models for small incomes. By this policy, the government attempts to 
enhance effort to reduce the possibility that individuals incur losses from low income. 
These findings have potentially important implications. For income taxation models, some of the 
results indicate a more likely case for progressive income taxation than one derived from 
conventional models. For economic research in general, the results of this paper show that it may 
become worthwhile assessing the robustness of other results, derived using expected utility 
maximisation, to assumptions that are more in line with findings in behavioural economics. 
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Appendix: Prospect theory welfarism 
 
The government's objective function is now the same as the individuals, i.e., e. The Lagrangean 
and the first-order condition with respect to x (pointwise optimisation) are as follows: 
(A.1) [ ]{ } ydzfxxeyzfxzxxeL y −−−+−+−= ∫ ααλ )(),()()(  
(A.2) 
e
g ′=+
λα1  
Differentiate (A.2) again with respect to z and reorganise to obtain the shape of )(zx′ : 
(A.3) 
e
gex ′′
′′−=′ λ
α 2)(  
To provide incentives for exerting effort, x should be increasing in z. Depending on whether 
realised income is above or below the reference income, x , three cases emerge. 
 
1) For income above the reference income, xx > , consumption x is indeed increasing in income 
z,  since the value function has similar properties to the standard case of Section 2. In other 
words, ve = . The first-order approach is valid (following the arguments of equations (5)-(9), 
and the marginal tax rate is given by (11).  
 
2) If xx = , the right-hand side of (A.3) is not defined. 
 
3) If the income is below the reference income, xx < , the right-hand side of (A.3), i.e. )(zx′ , is 
non-negative only if 0<α , since 0>′′e . Using a similar procedure as in Section 2, one can 
determine the sign of α  from 
 (A.4) 
)
'
1,cov(
)
'
1,cov(
e
e
e
edzef y
=
=∫
λ
α
λ
α
 
Equation (A.4) is a counterpart of earlier equation (8). Now e  and 'e  covary in the same 
directions for xx <  , we necessarily have 0≤α . However, the only case where the covariance 
is zero is when x is constant irrespective of income. But then the worker has no incentives to 
provide positive effort. Therefore, to induce effort, 0<α . 
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However, if 0<α , a relaxation in the incentive constraint reduces the social welfare determined 
by (A.1). For a meaningful government optimisation problem this cannot hold. Therefore, one 
must conclude that the FOA is not valid for income below the reference level. As in prospect 
theory non-welfarism, the first-order approach is not a valid solution procedure for the entire 
range of realised income. 
 
The optimal incentive solution is again non-continuous. For incomes at or below the reference 
point ( xx ≤ ), it is a randomised schedule ( xx ,0 ). For income above the reference point ( xx > ), 
the FOA is valid and the standard solution, given in equation (11), applies.  
 
  
